Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Recently something close to a consensus about the best way to naturalize the notion of biological function appears to be emerging. Nonetheless, teleological notions in biology remain controversial. In this paper we provide a naturalistic analysis for the notion of natural design. Many authors assume that natural design should be assimilated directly to function. Others find the notion problematic because it suggests that evolution is a directed process. We argue that both of these views are mistaken. Our naturalistic account does not simply equate design with function. We argue that the distinction between function and design is important for understanding the evolution of the physical and behavioral traits of organisms.
We thank our colleagues at Texas A&M and the University of Colorado, Boulder, for discussing these issues with us. Conversations with Ruth Millikan and Rob Cummins have also helped us enormously. Finally, we thank Lawrence Shapiro, Elliott Sober, John Fentress, Kim Sterelny, Susan Townsend, Robert Eaton, and Nick Thompson for helpful comments on earlier and less optimal versions of this work. Parts of this essay were adapted from Allen & Bekoff 1995. CA gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF fellowship SBR-9320214 during preparation of this manuscript; MB was supported by a sabbatical leave from the University of Colorado, Boulder.
Send reprint requests to Colin Allen, Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843–4237, USA.