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Can a Historian of Science Be a Scientific Realist?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Theodore Arabatzis
Theodore Arabatzis*
Affiliation:
University of Athens
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, Panepistimioupolis (Ano Ilisia), GR-157 71 Athens, Greece; e-mail: tarabatz@cc.uoa.gr.
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Abstract

In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples, Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which faces problems. Finally, I suggest that for historiographical purposes an agnostic attitude with respect to scientifictheories and unobservable entities is the most appropriate.

Type
History and Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue S3: No. 3 Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 2001 , 2001 , pp. S531 - S541
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

‡

I am grateful to Tara Abraham, Kostas Gavroglu, Oma Harari-Eshel, Annette Imhausen, Christophe Lecuyer, Eman McMullin, Massimo Mazzotti, Nancy Nersessian, Elizabeth Paris, Stathis Psillos, Erdinc Sayan, Jutta Schickore, Bas van Fraassen, and Andre Wakefield for discussion and comments.

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