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Can Cumulative Selection Explain Adaptation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Bence Nanay
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Abstract

Two strong arguments have been given in favor of the claim that no selection process can play a role in explaining adaptations. According to the first argument, selection is a negative force; it may explain why the eliminated individuals are eliminated, but it does not explain why the ones that survived (or their offspring) have the traits they have. The second argument points out that the explanandum and the explanans are phenomena at different levels: selection is a population-level phenomenon, whereas adaptation occurs on the individual level. Thus, selection can explain why individuals in a certain population have a certain trait, but it cannot explain why a certain individual has this trait. After pointing out that both arguments ignore the significance of the limitation of environmental resources, I will construe a positive argument for the claim that cumulative selection processes can, indeed, play a role in explaining adaptations.

Type
Natural Selection and Evolution
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 1099 - 1112
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am grateful for comments from Paul Griffiths, David Papineau, John MacFarlane, James Sage, and Branden Fitelson, as well as for comments on earlier versions of this paper presented at the July 2003 Biannual Conference of the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology, the April 2004 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, and the November 2004 Biannual Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.

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