Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T12:42:52.180Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Carnap's Definition of ‘Analytic Truth’ for Scientific Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

J. K. Derden Jr.
J. K. Derden Jr.*
Affiliation:
Humboldt State University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In this paper Rudolf Carnap's definition of ‘analytic truth’ based upon a meaning postulate At, for theoretical predicates of a given scientific theory is subjected to critique. It is argued that this definition is both too exclusive and too inclusive. Assuming that the preceding is correct, At is subjected to further scrutiny to determine how to interpret it and whether, and under what conditions, it need even be true. It is argued that a given At need not be true as a sentence in a scientific theory and that it must be regarded as a confusedly presented rule for the same. It is then argued that even as a semantical rule for the theory, At cannot provide a guarantee of truth for some meaning postulate similar to At in the theory itself. It is thus argued that Carnap's definition of ‘analytic truth’ for theoretical predicates is unsatisfactory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , December 1976 , pp. 506 - 522
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Ammerman, R., ed. Classics of Analytic Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.Google Scholar
Bar-Hillel, Y., Poznanski, E. I. J., Robin, M. O., Robinson, A., eds. Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics, Dedicated to A. A. Fraenkel on His Seventieth Anniversary. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, the Hebrew University, 1961.Google Scholar
Bohnert, H. G. “Communication by Ramsey-Sentence Clause.” Philosophy of Science, 34 (1967): 341–347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carnap, R. “Carl G. Hempel on Scientific Theories.” In [15], Pages 958–966.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. Meaning and Necessity (Enlarged edition). Chicago: University of Chicago, 1956.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. “On the Use of Hillbert's ∊-Operator in Scientific Theories.” In [1], Pages 156–164.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. Edited by Gardner, M. New York: Basic Books, 1966.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. “Testability and Meaning.” In [1], Pages 130–195.Google Scholar
Derden, J. K. Jr. “Analyticity and Scientific Theories with Special Reference to the Work of Rudolf Carnap.” Doctoral thesis: University of Toronto, 1971.Google Scholar
Feigl, H., Scriven, M., Maxwell, G., eds. Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. II. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1958.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. “The Theoretician's Dilemma.” In [10], Pages 37–98.Google Scholar
Przelecki, M. The Logic of Empirical Theories. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.Google Scholar
Scheffler, I. The Anatomy of Inquiry. New York: Knopf, 1963.Google Scholar
Schilpp, P. A., ed. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1963.Google Scholar
Suppe, F. “On Partial Interpretation” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 57–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar