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Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Paul Thagard
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Abstract

What is the relation between coherence and truth? This paper rejects numerous answers to this question, including the following: truth is coherence; coherence is irrelevant to truth; coherence always leads to truth; coherence leads to probability, which leads to truth. I will argue that coherence of the right kind leads to at least approximate truth. The right kind is explanatory coherence, where explanation consists in describing mechanisms. We can judge that a scientific theory is progressively approximating the truth if it is increasing its explanatory coherence in two key respects: broadening by explaining more phenomena and deepening by investigating layers of mechanisms. I sketch an explanation of why deepening is a good epistemic strategy and discuss the prospect of deepening knowledge in the social sciences and everyday life.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 74 , Issue 1 , January 2007 , pp. 28 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

For helpful suggestions, I am grateful to Josh Brown, Dave DeVidi, Eric Lormand, Elijah Millgram, Eric Olsson, Peter Railton, and anonymous referees.

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