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Confirmation and Prediction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

G. H. Merrill
G. H. Merrill*
Affiliation:
Loyola University of Chicago
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Abstract

It is argued that Hempel's original rejection of the prediction criterion of confirmation in [8] (on the grounds that it leads to a circular definition of confirmation) was ill-conceived, and that his own approach exhibits undesirable consequences to the degree that it deviates from this criterion. A version of the prediction criterion is formulated which, in addition to being-non circular, escapes the criticisms advanced against Hempel's satisfaction criterion, offers certain clear advantages over alternative approaches, and may serve as the basis for a theory of qualitative confirmation. The definition of confirmation developed here violates two of Hempel's three criteria of adequacy, and in showing why it should do so some light is shed on various issues in the debate concerning the acceptability of these criteria.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , March 1979 , pp. 98 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1979

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References

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