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Counterfactual Conditionals and the Presuppositions of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

William Todd
William Todd*
Affiliation:
University of Cincinnati
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Abstract

In this paper I will argue that Professor Goodman was correct in thinking that there is a problem concerning counterfactual conditionals, but that it is somewhat different from the problem he thought it to be, and is one that is even more basic. I will also try to show that this problem is distinct from Hume's “problem” of induction, and that additional assumptions have to be made for counterfactual induction beyond those required for other kinds of induction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , April 1964 , pp. 101 - 110
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1964

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References

1 N. Goodman, “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals,” J. of Philosophy, Feb. 1947.

2 J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 166 (note).

3 See also J. Canfield, “The Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism”, Phil. Rev., July, 1962.

4 For a discussion of general inductive assumptions see A. W. Burks, “On the Presuppositions of Induction”, Rev. of Metaphysics, June, 1955.

5 This brings up the question of the size and composition of the class concerned, and this in turn involves the distinction between a causal law and an accidentally true generalization. Goodman discusses this under the heading of “The problem of law” in his article. On this point see also Chisholm, “The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional”, Mind, ‘46 and Burks, “The Logic of Causal Propositions”, Mind ‘51.

6 Goodman, op. cit., pp. 120–121.

7 For an alternative way of handling Goodman's problem, see Wilfrid Sellars, “Counter-factuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities”, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2. See particularly pp. 240–248.

8 I have in mind here an analysis of causal law similar to that of Burks in “The Logic of Causal Propositions”, Mind, 1951. If one takes an extensional analysis the second assumption will be unnecessary.