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Deductive Explanation and Prediction Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

W. A. Suchting
W. A. Suchting*
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
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Abstract

The paper has two main aims. The first is to reformulate Hempel's version of the thesis of the symmetry of explanation and prediction, as regards the deductive covering-law model, so as to generalise it and make it no longer subject to some of the criticisms which have been directed at it (Section II). The second aim is to consider, with special critical reference to Hempel's recent treatment in Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York and London, 1965), some central criticisms of both the constituent parts of the above symmetry thesis, viz. that adequate explanations are potentially predictive (Section III), and that adequate predictive arguments are potentially explanatory (Section IV).

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 1967 , pp. 41 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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References

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