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Discussion: Partly Deductive Support in The Popper-Miller Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Burke Townsend*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Montana

Abstract

Popper and Miller (1983) have presented an argument purporting to establish the impossibility of inductive probability. Here I discuss critically their characterization of a deductive part of nondeductive support, a point that has not figured centrally in previous responses.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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