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Do Counterfactuals Ground the Laws of Nature? A Critique of Lange

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Heather Demarest
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Abstract

Most philosophers of science hold that the laws of nature play an important role in determining which counterfactuals are true. Marc Lange reverses this dependence, arguing that it is the truth of certain counterfactuals that determines which statements are laws. I argue that the context sensitivity of counterfactual sentences makes it impossible for them to determine the laws. Next, I argue that Lange's view cannot avoid additional counterexamples concerning nested counterfactuals. Finally, I argue that Lange's counterfacts, posited as the ultimate ontological ground for the laws of nature, are unsuited to the role he demands of them.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 79 , Issue 3 , July 2012 , pp. 333 - 344
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Zachary Miller, Barry Loewer, Jonathan Schaffer, Branden Fitelson, Marc Lange, Thomas Blanchard, Alex Skiles, two anonymous referees, and many others for very helpful comments on earlier drafts and thoughtful discussions on these issues.

References

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