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The Dome: An Unexpectedly Simple Failure of Determinism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

John D. Norton
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Abstract

Newton's equations of motion tell us that a mass at rest at the apex of a dome with the shape specified here can spontaneously move. It has been suggested that this indeterminism should be discounted since it draws on an incomplete rendering of Newtonian physics, or it is “unphysical,” or it employs illicit idealizations. I analyze and reject each of these reasons.

Type
The Vagaries of Determinism and Indeterminism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 75 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander , December 2008 , pp. 786 - 798
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

My thanks to my cosymposiasts, John Earman and David Malament; to Michael Dickson, Bernie Goldstein, Stephan Hartmann, Alexandre Korolev, and Dmitri Tymoczko; and to visiting fellows of the Center for Philosophy of Science: Boris Grozdanoff, Antigone Nounou, Hernan Pringe, and Stéphanie Ruphy.

References

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