Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
This essay is, primarily, a discussion of four results about the principle of maximizing entropy (MAXENT) and its connections with Bayesian theory. Result1 provides a restricted equivalence between the two: where the Bayesian model for MAXENT inference uses an “a priori“ probability that is uniform, and where all MAXENT constraints are limited to 0–1 expectations for simple indicator-variables. The other three results report on an inability to extend the equivalence beyond these specialized constraints. Result2 established a sensitivity of MAXENT inference to the choice of the algebra of possibilities even though all empirical constraints imposed on the MAXENT solution are satisfied in each measure space considered. The resulting MAXENT distribution is not invariant over the choice of measure space. Thus, old and familiar problems with the Laplacian principle of Insufficient Reason also plague MAXENT theory. Result3 builds upon the findings of Friedman and Shimony (1971; 1973) and demonstrates the absence of an exchangeable, Bayesian model for predictive MAXENT distributions when the MAXENT constraints are interpreted according to Jaynes's (1978) prescription for his (1963) Brandeis Dice problem. Lastly, Result4 generalizes the Friedman and Shimony objection to cross-entropy (Kullback-information) shifts subject to a constraint of a new odds-ratio for two disjoint events.
I thank J. Kadane, I. Levi, and A. Shimony for their detailed, constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Also, I have benefited from discussions with: A. Denzau, C. Genest, P. Gibbons, E. Greenberg, E. Jaynes, M. Schervish, G. Tsebelis, B. Wise, the members of the Philosophy Department Colloquium at Carnegie-Mellon University, and other helpful critics at the 29th NBER-NSF Seminar on Bayesian Inference in Economics.
Support for this research came from the Department of Preventive Medicine, Washington University (St. Louis), and N.S.F. Grant #SES-8607300.