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Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of the Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

D. M. Armstrong
D. M. Armstrong*
Affiliation:
Sydney University
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Abstract

A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) “higher” sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , June 1973 , pp. 178 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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