Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
B. F. Skinner's claim that “operant behavior is essentially the field of purpose” is systematically explored. It is argued that Charles Taylor's illuminating analysis of the explanatory significance of common-sense goal-ascriptions (1) lends some (fairly restricted) support to Skinner's claim, (2) considerably clarifies the conceptual significance of differences between operant and respondent behavior and conditioning, and (3) undercuts influential assertions (e.g., Taylor's) that research programs for behavioristic psychology share a “mechanistic” orientation. A strategy is suggested for assessing the plausibility of Skinner's broader claims about the adequacy of the operant behaviorist program for the analysis of purposive behavior.
I would like to thank Theodore Mischel for inviting me to participate in his 1974 NEH summer seminar, and Kenneth MacCorquodale for allowing me to audit his excellent course on operant behaviorism during the 1973–74 academic year. These two opportunities greatly facilitated the writing of this paper. Support of preliminary research for the paper was provided by a 1973 Indiana University Summer Faculty Fellowship. Writing of the paper was partially supported by NSF grant SOC 75-13423. Support from these two sources and from NEH is gratefully acknowledged.