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Explanatory Conditionals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Holger Andreas
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Abstract

This article aims to complement causal model approaches to causal explanation by James Woodward, Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl, and Michael Strevens. It centers on a strengthened Ramsey Test of conditionals: α≫γ if and only if, after suspending judgment about α and γ, an agent can infer γ from the supposition of α (in the context of further beliefs in the background). Holger Andreas and Mario Günther used this conditional as the starting point of an analysis of ‘because’ in natural language. I refine this analysis so as to yield a fully fledged account of (deterministic) causal explanation.

Type
Logic, Formal Epistemology, and Decision Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 86 , Issue 5 , December 2019 , pp. 993 - 1004
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

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To contact the author, please write to: Department of Economics, Philosophy and Political Science, University of British Columbia Okanagan, 1147 Research Road, Kelowna, BC V1V 1V7, Canada; e-mail: holger.andreas@ubc.ca.

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