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Feminist Epistemology: Implications for Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Cassandra L. Pinnick
Cassandra L. Pinnick*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Western Kentucky University
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, KY 42101, USA.
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Abstract

This article examines the best contemporary arguments for a feminist epistemology of scientific knowledge as found in recent works by S. Harding. I argue that no feminist epistemology of science is worthy of the name, because such an epistemology fails to escape well-known vicissitudes of epistemic relativism. But feminist epistemology merits attention from philosophers of science because it is part of a larger relativist turn in the social sciences and humanities that now aims to extend its critique to science, and Harding's “standpoint feminism” is the best-developed case. She attempts to make new use of discredited philosophical ideas concerning underdetermination, Planck's Hypothesis, and the role of counterfactuals in historical studies of science.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 61 , Issue 4 , December 1994 , pp. 646 - 657
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1994

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Footnotes

†

For general inspiration and discussion, I acknowledge L. Laudan, R. Laudan, P. Hamlett, J. Maffie, L. Mayhew, and W. Schmaus.

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