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Fitness as Primitive and Propensity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Alexander Rosenberg  and
Mary Williams
Alexander Rosenberg
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside
Mary Williams
Affiliation:
Center for Science and Culture, University of Delaware
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Extract

In several places we have argued that ‘fitness’ is a primitive term with respect to the theory of evolution properly understood (Rosenberg 1978, 1982, 1983; Williams 1976). These arguments have relied heavily on the axiomatization of the theory provided by one of us (Williams 1970). In contrast, both John Beatty and Robert Brandon have separately argued for a “propensity“ interpretation of “fitness” (Mills and Beatty 1979; Brandon 1978); and in Brandon and Beatty (1984) they attack our view that “fitness“ is a primitive term in evolutionary theory, concluding that a definition by way of propensities is possible and preferable. Here we reply to their criticisms, and argue that, at most, the view that fitness is a statistical propensity is a terminological variant on our thesis that it is a primitive in evolutionary theory.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 53 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 412 - 418
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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References

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