Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-j824f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T02:36:51.145Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Robert Nola
Robert Nola*
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Kripke and Putnam have proposed that terms may be introduced to refer to theoretical entities by means of causal descriptions such as 'whatever causes observable effects O'. It is argued that such a reference-fixing definition is ill-formed and that theoretical beliefs must be involved in fixing the reference of a theoretical term. Some examples of reference-fixing are discussed e.g., the term 'electricity'. The Kripke-Putnam theory can not give an account of how terms may be introduced into science and then subsequently be discovered to be non-referring. A modified account of reference-fixing is suggested in which terms such as Gilbert's ‘electric effluvia’ and ‘phlogiston’ can be introduced into science and then be found to lack a reference.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , December 1980 , pp. 505 - 531
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

In writing this paper I am indebted to my colleague Fred Kroon for many discussions and perceptive criticism, and to Risto Hilpinen and George Hughes for comments on an earlier version.

References

Cohen, I. B. (1956), Franklin and Newton, The American Philosophical Society; Philadelphia.Google Scholar
Enç, B. (1976), ‘Reference of Theoretical Terms’ Nous 10, pp. 261–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harré, R. (1970), The Method of Science, Wykeham Publications; London.Google Scholar
Kleiner, S. A. (1977), ‘Referential Divergence in Scientific Theories', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 8, pp. 87–109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. (1976), ‘Events as Property Exemplifications’ in M. Brand and D. Walton (eds.) Action Theory, D. Reidel; Boston, pp. 159–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. (1972), ‘Naming and Necessity’ in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, D. Reidel; Dordrecht, pp. 253–355.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kuhn, T. S. (1970), ‘Reflections on my Critics’ in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, pp. 231–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leicester, H. M. and Klickstein, H. S. (eds.) (1952), A Source Book in Chemistry: 1400–1900, Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.Google Scholar
Partington, J. R. (1961), A History of Chemistry: Vol. II, Macmillan; London.Google Scholar
Partington, J. R. (1962), A History of Chemistry: Vol. III, Macmillan; London.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Partington, J. R. (1970), A History of Chemistry: Vol. I, Part I, Macmillan; London.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. (1975), Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers: Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press; Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rodwell, G. F. (1868), ‘On the Theory of Phlogiston', Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, Fourth Series, Vol. 35, No. 234, pp. 1–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rorty, R. (1976), ‘Realism and Reference', Monist Vol. 59, pp. 321–40.Google Scholar