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From Fly Detectors to Action Control: Representations in Reinforcement Learning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Anna-Mari Rusanen ,
Otto Lappi ,
Jami Pekkanen  and
Jesse Kuokkanen
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Abstract

According to radical enactivists, cognitive sciences should abandon the representational framework. Perceptuomotor cognition and action control are often provided as paradigmatic examples of nonrepresentational cognitive phenomena. In this article, we illustrate how motor and action control are studied in research that uses reinforcement learning algorithms. Crucially, this approach can be given a representational interpretation. Hence, reinforcement learning provides a way to explicate action-oriented views of cognitive systems in a representational way.

Type
Cognitive Sciences
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 1045 - 1054
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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