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Hierarchy Maintenance, Coalition Formation, and the Origins of Altruistic Punishment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Yasha Rohwer
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Abstract

Game theory has played a critical role in elucidating the evolutionary origins of social behavior. Sober and Wilson (1999) model altruism as a prisoner's dilemma and claim that this model indicates that altruism arose from group selection pressures. Sober and Wilson also suggest that the prisoner's dilemma model can be used to characterize punishment; hence, punishment too originated from group selection pressures. However, empirical evidence suggests that a group selection model of the origins of altruistic punishment may be insufficient. I argue that examining dominance hierarchies and coalition formation in chimpanzee societies suggests that the origins of altruistic punishment may be best captured by individual selection models. I suggest that this shows the necessity of coupling of game-theoretic models with a conception of what our actual social structure may have been like to best model the origins of our own behavior.

Type
Decision and Game Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 74 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander , December 2007 , pp. 802 - 812
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Zachary Ernst and Emma Marris for their many helpful comments which greatly improved this paper.

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