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In Favor of Logarithmic Scoring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Randall G. McCutcheon
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Abstract

Shuford, Albert, and Massengill proved, a half century ago, that the logarithmic scoring rule is the only proper measure of inaccuracy determined by a differentiable function of probability assigned the actual cell of a scored partition. In spite of this, the log rule has gained less traction in applied disciplines and among formal epistemologists that one might expect. In this article we show that the differentiability criterion in the Shuford et al. result is unnecessary and use the resulting simplified characterization of the logarithmic rule to give novel arguments in favor of it.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 86 , Issue 2 , April 2019 , pp. 286 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Steve Kalikow and the anonymous referees and editors at Philosophy of Science.

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