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Induction and Reasoning to the Best Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

R. A. Fumerton
R. A. Fumerton*
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Abstract

In this paper I want to cast doubt on the claim that there is a legitimate process of reasoning to the best explanation which can serve as an alternative to either straightforward inductive reasoning or a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning. I shall argue a) that paradigmatic cases of acceptable arguments to the best explanation must be considered enthymemes and b) that when the suppressed premises are made explicit we have all of the premises we need to present either a straightforward inductive argument or an argument employing both induction and deduction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , December 1980 , pp. 589 - 600
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

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