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Initiating Coordination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Paul Weirich
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Abstract

How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium.

Type
Decision and Game Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 74 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander , December 2007 , pp. 790 - 801
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I thank the audience at my paper's presentation at the 2006 PSA meeting for many insightful points.

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