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The Justification of Probability Measures in Statistical Mechanics*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Kevin Davey
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Abstract

According to a standard view of the second law of thermodynamics, our belief in the second law can be justified by pointing out that low-entropy macrostates are less probable than high-entropy macrostates, and then noting that a system in an improbable state will tend to evolve toward a more probable state. I would like to argue that this justification of the second law is unhelpful at best and wrong at worst, and will argue that certain puzzles sometimes associated with the second law are merely artifacts of this questionable justification.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 75 , Issue 1 , January 2008 , pp. 28 - 44
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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