Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T09:31:31.190Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Logic of the Sensum Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

George Gentry
George Gentry*
Affiliation:
The University of Texas, Austin
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The most satisfactory way of isolating the specific issues with which this paper is concerned is by way of a brief summary of the theory and its internal development. The development of the theory embodies two major movements. These are: (a) an analysis of what the author considers the typical perceptual experience, “a perceptual situation”, and (b) the projection of a theory of the physical world on the basis of the results derived. We may consider these in order.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , April 1943 , pp. 81 - 89
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1943

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

This paper is a revision of the writer's paper, “Mr. Broad and the Case for the Sensum Theory”, presented at the 1932 meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

References

2 Broad, C. D.: The Mind and Its Place in Nature, New York City, 1925, p. 219.

3 Ibid., pp. 218–219.

4 Ibid., p. 347.

5 Broad, C. D.: Scientific Thought, New York, 1923, p. 268.

6 Broad, C. D.: The Mind and Its Place in Nature, New York, 1925, p. 208.

7 Ibid., pp. 217–218.

8 Broad, C. D.: Scientific Thought, New York, 1923, p. 267.

9 Ibid., p. 269.

10 Ibid., p. 267.

11 Broad, C. D.: The Mind and Its Place in Nature, New York City, 1925, p. 152.

12 Ibid., p. 217.

13 Broad, C. D.: Scientific Thought, New York, 1923, p. 268.

14 Broad, C. D.: The Mind and Its Place in Nature, New York City, 1925, cf., pp. 196–198, 199–200; Scientific Thought, p. 268.

15 Broad, C. D.: Scientific Thought, N. Y., 1923, p. 269. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, N. Y., 1925, p. 198–200.

16 Broad's treatment of the second issue strongly suggests to the writer that he naively operates under the misapprehension that if the hypothesis has antecedent probability then the facts which are assumed to increase its probability may be construed as instances of it; whether he does construe them in this manner or not the function ascribed to them in argument is difficult to distinguish from the function of instances on a numerical theory of probability.