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Making Fit Fit

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Michael Townsen Hicks
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Abstract

Reductionist accounts of objective chance rely on a notion of fit, which ties the chances at a world to the frequencies at that world. Here, I criticize extant measures of the fit of a chance system and draw on recent literature in epistemic utility theory to propose a new model: chances fit a world insofar as they are accurate at that world. I show how this model of fit does a better job of explaining the normative features of chance, its role in the laws of nature, and its status as an expert function than do previous accounts.

Type
Laws and Natural Kinds
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 5 , December 2017 , pp. 931 - 943
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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