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Manipulation and the Causes of Evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Kenneth Reisman  and
Patrick Forber
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Abstract

Evolutionary processes such as natural selection and random drift are commonly regarded as causes of population-level change. We respond to a recent challenge that drift and selection are best understood as statistical trends, not causes. Our reply appeals to manipulation as a strategy for uncovering causal relations: if an appropriately controlled manipulation of variable A results in a systematic change in variable B, then A is a cause of B. We argue that selection and drift can be manipulated to produce different kinds of population-level change. They should therefore be regarded as causes.

Type
Natural Selection and Evolution
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 1113 - 1123
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Both authors contributed equally to this article. We would like to thank Elliott Sober, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Lisa Lloyd, Bill Wimsatt, and audiences at the Australian National University and the 2004 PSA meeting in Austin for helpful comments and discussion.

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