Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Microaggressions are, roughly, acts or states of affairs that express prejudice or neglect toward members of oppressed groups in relatively subtle ways. There is an apparent consensus among both proponents and critics of the microaggression concept that microaggressions are “subjective.” We examine what subjectivity amounts to in this context and argue against this consensus. We distinguish between microaggressions as an explanatory posit and microaggressions as a hermeneutical tool, arguing that in either case there is no reason at present to regard microaggressions as subjective and that microaggressions in the hermeneutical sense should be regarded as objective.
This article is the result of ongoing discussions between the authors; Mikio Akagi is responsible for much of the specific language in the article; Frederick Gooding contributed to many stages of planning, discussion, and revision. We thank, for their input and encouragement, Karen Kovaka, Nicholas Zautra, Rob Garnett, Andrew Ryder, and participants at the inaugural conference of the Mid/South Philosophy of Science Network and at the TCU Interdisciplinary Works in Progress talk series.