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The Modal Theory of Function Is Not about Functions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Marc Artiga
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Abstract

In a series of papers, Bence Nanay has recently put forward and defended a new theory of function, which he calls the ‘Modal Theory of Function’. In this article, I critically address this theory and argue that it fails to fulfill some key desiderata that a satisfactory theory of function must comply with. As a result, I conclude that, whatever property Nanay’s notion of function refers to, it is not the property having the function that is standardly attributed in science.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 4 , October 2014 , pp. 580 - 591
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Vincenzo Fano, David Pineda, Monolo Martínez, José Diez, Giuliano Torrengo, and the audience of the II Barcelona-Urbino Meeting for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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