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Monism on the One Hand, Pluralism on the Other

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Matthew H. Slater
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Abstract

In this paper, I consider ways of responding to critiques of natural kinds monism recently suggested from the pluralist camp. Even if monism is determined to be untenable in certain domains (say, about species), it might well be tenable in others. Chemistry is suggested to be such a monist-friendly domain. Suggestions of trouble for chemical kinds can be defused by attending to the difference between monism as a metaphysical thesis and as a claim about classification systems. Finally, I consider enantiomers as a test case for the monism/pluralism debate. The question of whether enantiomers differ in kind does not appear easily answerable. I suggest that this legislates for pluralism in chemistry.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 1 , January 2005 , pp. 22 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

This paper owes much to discussions with the Columbia Metaphysicist Society (Andrea Borghini, Chris Haufe, Achille Varzi, Neil Williams, and Dave Wolfe) and extensive comments by Philip Kitcher, Achille Varzi, and two anonymous referees. Roy Sorensen will no doubt feel his influence on Section 5, having taught me much about incongruous counterparts.

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