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Musgrave's “Appraisals and Advice”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Husain Sarkar
Husain Sarkar*
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
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Extract

One recent problem in philosophy of science is, “Ought a methodology be construed, not merely as an instrument of appraisal, but also as a source of advice to the practising scientist(s)?” Imre Lakatos ([7], p. 174 and 178) and John Worrall ([11], p. 163), among others, have answered the question in the negative. Alan Musgrave disagrees. In a section entitled, “Appraisals and Advice,” in [9], Musgrave attempts to give us a deductive argument in support of his claim that methodologies should be construed as giving advice. After briefly explaining the plausibility of the claim, I shall present Musgrave's argument in full, and then examine each of his premises. I will try to show that his attempt to answer the above question in the affirmative raises some interesting questions, and which must be answered if his venture is to succeed. I should add, that if my objections are successful against Musgrave's attempt, it would be a Pyrrhic victory: I am neither an inductivist nor do I think that the answer to the question should be in the negative.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 478 - 483
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to the refree of this journal, Professor Gerald J. Massey, and my colleague Professor John R. Baker for their many helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

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