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A Neglected Proposal Concerning Simplicity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Robert Ackermann
Robert Ackermann*
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Abstract

This paper is intended to explore Jeffrey's proposal for the measurement of the simplicity of scientific laws. The first part is a sketch of Jeffreys’ development of a view on simplicity, which will be followed by a discussion of what seem to be some rather crucial defects in the proposal as it stands. It will be suggested here that no plausible way of countering these defects seems available.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , July 1963 , pp. 228 - 235
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1963

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References

[1] Ackermann, Robert. “Inductive Simplicity.” Philosophy of Science, XXVIII (1961), pp. 152–161.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard Press, 1955.Google Scholar
[3] Jeffreys, Harold, and Wrinch, Dorothy. “On Certain Fundamental Principles of Scientific Inquiry.” Philosophical Magazine, XLII (1921), pp. 369–390.Google Scholar
[4] Jeffreys, Harold. Scientific Inference. Cambridge, 1957.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Jeffreys, Harold. Theory of Probability. Oxford, 1961.Google Scholar
[6] Rozeboom, William W. “Ontological Induction and the Logical Typology of Scientific Variables.” Philosophy of Science, XXVIII (1961), pp. 337–378.10.1086/287823CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[7] Rudner, Richard S. “An Introduction to Simplicity.” Philosophy of Science, XXVIII (1961), pp. 109–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar