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New Dimensions of Confirmation Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

William W. Rozeboom
William W. Rozeboom*
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
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Abstract

When Hempel's “paradox of confirmation” is developed within the confines of conditional probability theory, it becomes apparent that two seemingly equivalent generalities (“laws”) can have exactly the same class of observational refuters even when their respective classes of confirming observations are importantly distinct. Generalities which have the inductive supports we commonsensically construe them to have, however, must incorporate quasi-logical operators or connectives which cannot be defined truth-functionally. The origins and applications of these “modalic” concepts appear to be intimately linked with a number of basic conundrums in the philosophy of science, such as causation and the nature of explanation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , June 1968 , pp. 134 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © 1968 The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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