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Newtonian Forces and Evolutionary Biology: A Problem and Solution for Extending the Force Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

There has recently been a renewed interest in the “force” interpretation of evolutionary biology. In this article, I present the general structure of the arguments for the force interpretation and identify a problem in its overly permissive conditions for being a Newtonian force. I then attempt a solution that (1) helps to illuminate the difference between forces and other types of causes and (2) makes room for random genetic drift as a force. In particular, I argue that forces are not different in kind from other types of causes but rather that forces are situated on a continuum of causes distinguished by their unifying power.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Thanks to Malcolm Forster, Daniel Hausman, Elliott Sober, Joel Velasco, and the audience at the 2008 PSA meeting for helpful comments and criticisms.

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