Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-j824f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T04:41:45.557Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Nomic Concepts, Frames, and Conceptual Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Hanne Andersen  and
Nancy J. Nersessian
Hanne Andersen*
Affiliation:
University of Copenhagen, Panum Institute
Nancy J. Nersessian*
Affiliation:
Georgia Institute of Technology
*
† Send requests for reprints to the authors. Hanne Andersen: Department for Medical Philosophy and Clinical Theory, University of Copenhagen, Panum Institute, Blegdamsvej 3, DK-2200 Copenhagen N; e-mail: h.andersen@medphil.ku.dk.
Nancy Nersessian: School of Public Policy and College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GE 30332–0345; e-mail: nancyn@cc.gatech.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published at the beginning of what has come to be known as “the cognitive revolution.” With hindsight one can construct significant parallels between the problems of knowledge, perception, and learning with which Kuhn and cognitive scientists were grappling and between the accounts developed by each. However, by and large Kuhn never utilized the research in cognitive science—especially in cognitive psychology—that we believe would have furthered his own paradigm. This is puzzling since he did not have the traditional philosophical aversion to “psychologizing” and in fact drew on insights from psychology to support the most radical claims in Structure, such as the “Gestalt switch” nature of conceptual change. Indeed, the research program outlined there seems intrinsically historical, philosophical, and psychological and Kuhn's work has had considerable influence on research in cognitive science.

Type
Experiment and Conceptual Change
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Sep., 2000 , 2000 , pp. S224 - S241
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Andersen, H., Barker, P., and Chen, X. (1996), “Kuhn's Mature Philosophy of Science and Cognitive Psychology”, Philosophical Psychology 9: 347–364.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barsalou, L. (1992), “Frames, Concepts, and Conceptual Fields”, in Lehrer, A. and Kittay, E. F. (eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrast. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 21–74.Google Scholar
Chen, X., Andersen, H., and Barker, P. (1998), “Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology”, Philosophical Psychology 11: 5–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1993), Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions. Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kuhn, T. S. (1970a), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kuhn, T. S. (1970b), “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–20.Google Scholar
Kuhn, T. S. (1970c), “Reflections on My Critics”, in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 231–278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kuhn, T. S. (1974), “Second Thoughts on Paradigms”, in Suppe, F. (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Reprinted in T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1977), 293–319.Google Scholar
Kuhn, T. S. (1979), “Metaphor in Science”, in Ortony, A. (ed.), Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kuhn, T. S. (1993), “Afterwords”, in Horwich, P. (ed.), World Changes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 311–342.Google Scholar
Nersessian, N. J. (1984), Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific Theories. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nersessian, N. J. (1985), “Faraday's Field Concept”, in Gooding, D. and James, F. A. J. L. (eds.), Faraday Rediscovered: Essays on the Life and Work of Michael Faraday. London: Macmillan, 377–406.Google Scholar
Nersessian, N. J. and Andersen, H. (1997), “Conceptual Change and Incommensurability: A Cognitive-Historical View”, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 32: 111–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar