Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T03:57:46.280Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Old Evidence and New Explanation III

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Carl G. Wagner
Carl G. Wagner*
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Mathematics, 121 Ayres Hall, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996–1300; email: wagner@math.utk.edu.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Garber (1983) and Jeffrey (1991, 1995) have both proposed solutions to the old evidence problem. Jeffrey's solution, based on a new probability revision method called reparation, has been generalized to the case of uncertain old evidence and probabilistic new explanation in Wagner 1997, 1999. The present paper reformulates some of the latter work, highlighting the central role of Bayes factors and their associated uniformity principle, and extending the analysis to the case in which an hypothesis bears on a countable family of evidentiary propositions. This extension shows that no Garber-type approach is capable of reproducing the results of generalized reparation.

Type
Bayesian Methodology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue S3: No. 3 Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 2001 , 2001 , pp. S165 - S175
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

Research supported by the National Science Foundation (SES - 9984005). Thanks to Richard Jeffrey and Brian Skyrms for enlightening discussions.

References

Diaconis, Persi and Zabell, Sandy (1982), “Updating Subjective Probability”, Journal of the American Statistical Association 77:822–830.10.1080/01621459.1982.10477893CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Earman, John (ed.) (1983), Testing Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science X. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Earman, John (ed.) (1992), Bayes or Bust?. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Eells, Ellery (1990), “Bayesian Problems of Old Evidence”, in Savage, C. W. (ed.), Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science XIV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 205–223.Google Scholar
Garber, Daniel (1983), “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, in Earman 1983, 99–132.Google Scholar
Glymour, Clark (1980), Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Good, Irving J. (1950), Probability and the Weighing of Evidence. London: Charles Griffin.Google Scholar
Good, Irving J. (1983), Good Thinking. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, Richard (1983), “Bayesianism with a Human Face”, in Earman 1983, 133–156. Reprinted in Jeffrey 1992, 77–107.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, Richard (1991), “Postscript 1991: New Explanation Revisited”, in Jeffrey 1992, 103–107.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, Richard (1992), Probability and the Art of Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139172394CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jeffrey, Richard (1995), “Probability Reparation: The Problem of New Explanation”, Philosophical Studies 77:97–102.10.1007/BF00996313CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wagner, Carl (1997), “Old Evidence and New Explanation”, Philosophy of Science 64:677–691.10.1086/392578CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jeffrey, Richard (1999), “Old Evidence and New Explanation II”, Philosophy of Science 66:283–288.Google Scholar