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On a Proposed Revolution in Logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Hector Neri Castaneda
Hector Neri Castaneda*
Affiliation:
Wayne State University
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Abstract

In his The Uses of Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1958), S. Toulmin presents serious charges against ordinary logical theory, e.g., that it does not distinguish between analytic or formally valid or conclusive or warrant-using arguments, that the distinction between premises and conclusion is a bad oversimplification, that “major premise” conceals the distinction between inference-warrant and inference-backings, that logicians have been mistakenly working under an ideal of geometrical form.

The paper argues that none of the charges is proven, that most of them cannot be proven, that Toulmin's new logic is at best only vaguely hinted at and that his suggestions are positively obscure or mistaken.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , July 1960 , pp. 279 - 292
Copyright
Copyright © 1959 by Philosophy of Science Association

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References

1. Castaneda, H. N. “Are Conditionals Principles of Inference ?” Analysis, XVIII (1957-58; 77–82.Google Scholar
2. Clark, Romane. “Natural Inference,” Mind, n.s. LXV (1956): 455–472.10.1093/mind/65.1.455CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3. Ryle, Gilbert. “'If', 'So' and 'Because',” in Philosophical Analysis (ed. Max Black, Longon: Kegan Paul, 1952): 323–340.Google Scholar
4. Sellars, Wilfrid S. “Inference and Meaning,” Mind, n.s. LXII (1953): 313–338.10.1093/mind/LXII.247.313CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5. Toulmin, Stephen. The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: University Press, 1958).Google Scholar