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On Accepting Van Fraassen's Image of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jeff Foss
Jeff Foss*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba
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Abstract

In his book, The Scientific Image, van Fraassen lucidly draws an alternative to scientific realism, which he calls “Constructive Empiricism”. In this epistemological theory, the concept of observability plays the pivotal role: acceptable theories may be believed only where what they say solely concerns observables. Van Fraassen develops a concept of observability which is, as he admits, vague, relative, science-dependent, and anthropocentric. I draw out unacceptable consequences of each of these aspects of his concept. Also, I argue against his assumption that “empirical adequacy” is the same thing as “saving the phenomena”, according to his sense of the expressions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 79 - 92
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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Footnotes

†

I am indebted to the comments of the two referees of this journal who read an earlier version of this paper; they were, respectively, frank and constructive.

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