Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Foss's critique of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is shown to be completely wide of the mark (Foss 1984, van Fraassen 1980). Foss misunderstands van Fraassen's use of the terms ‘observable’, ‘phenomena’, ‘empirical adequacy’, and ‘epistemic community’. He misconstrues constructive empiricism as making knowledge, and perhaps existence, dependent on the observer. On the basis of this error, he attempts to reduce constructive empiricism to skepticism. None of his criticisms are to the point.
I am indebted to van Fraassen for comments in conversation following an earlier version of this paper delivered in reply to Foss at the World Congress in Philosophy, Montreal, Canada, August 1983. At that time, van Fraassen concurred with all my objections to Foss, but my reply has been revised to meet subsequent changes in Foss's paper. Dr. Bonnie Thurston, Prof. Edwin Levy and an anonymous reviewer have also made very helpful comments.