Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
One of the issues dividing “absolutists” and “relationists” is the question whether all motion is relative motion or, in the words of Earman, spacetime has “structures that support absolute quantities of motion.” This paper argues that, despite the enormous literature bearing on the topic, it is problematic to formulate a general criterion for when a quantity counts as absolute in contrast to merely relative in a way that is not hopelessly parasitic on other, presumably distinct, senses of “absolute.” Furthermore, I suggest that the vicissitudes of the evolution of the concept of absolute motion have contributed to this difficulty.
Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore MD 21218.
I would like to thank Mike Friedman and Don Howard for numerous and helpful comments concerning both substance and details. Also, I would like to thank Philip Kitcher for his tremendous, but fortunately not infinite, patience. A precursor to this paper was presented to the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh many years ago.