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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
If the history of civilization is to be an instrument for the advancement of civilization, historians must break new paths toward a wider and deeper understanding of human affairs. Despite the achievements of those who have explored the influence of technics, the power of nationalism, the rôle of mass-psychology, the economic factors in political and social life, our analyses of history are from a scientific standpoint still all too primitive. As John Dewey has said, “It is possible to study a multitude of histories, and yet permit history, the record of the transitions and transformations of human activities, to escape us. Taking history in separate doses of this country and that, we take it as a succession of isolated finalities, each one in due season giving way to another, as supernumeraries succeed one another in a march across the stage. We thus miss the fact of history and also its lesson; the diversity of institutional forms and customs which the same human nature may produce and employ.“
1 Cf. Charles A. Beard, A Charter for the Social Sciences (New York, 1932); Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commission on the Social Studies, American Historical Association (New York, 1935).
2 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (Modern Library Edition, New York, 1930), 110.
3 Franz Boas, “The Aims of Anthropological Research”, Science, (Dec. 30, 1932), 76: 605-13, and Anthropology and Modern Life (New York, 1928), 198-236; Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms (New York, 1936), 1-45.
4 Cf. George Santayana, The Life of Reason or the Phases of Human Progress (2nd ed.; New York, 1927), 5 vols. No historian in Europe or America, to the best of my knowledge, has ever used this most brilliant study in the philosophy of civilization to illuminate any discussion of social values.
5 Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston and New York, 1934), 46.
6 “It is important to realize that a whole is a new single term, distinct from each of its parts and from all of them: it is one, not many, and is related to the parts, but has a being distinct from theirs.” Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics (Cambridge, 1903), 141. The classic definition of culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” was given by Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture (6th ed.; London, 1920) I, 1. Cf. Alexander Goldenweiser, History, Psychology, and Culture (New York, 1933) 121-66; B. Malinowski, “Culture, Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, 4: 621-45; Bernhard J. Stern, “Concerning the Distinction between the Social and the Cultural,” Social Forces (Dec. 1929), 8: 264-71.
7 Bertrand Russell, op. cit., 141. Cf. Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature (New York, 1931), 154, 249-82, 344-67; H. Levy, Universe of Science (New York, 1933) 31-81; Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society (New York, 1935), trans. A. Bongiorno and A. Livingston, I, 18-74; Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge, 1931-1935), I, 27, II, 5-9.
8 Ruth Benedict, op. cit., 57-222.
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (New York, 1923), trans. W. A. Haussmann, 61. Cf. Walter Pater, Greek Studies (London, 1928), 1-41.
10 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, 1934), I, 133 presents a list of some 21 important historic civilizations.
11 George Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy (New York, 1916), 141-2.
12 Santayana, The Life of Reason presents an elaborate study of this theme.
13 Ruth Benedict, op. cit., 52; Werner Brock, An introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy (Cambridge, 1935), 20-6, 123-4; and H. L. Friess: “Wilhelm Dilthey”, Journal of Philosophy, (1929), XXVI: 5-25, furnish a good introduction to Dilthey's work. John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York, 1931), 3-12 presents a sociological interpretation of the history of philosophy that is comparable to Dilthey's. Morris R. Cohen, “Vision and Technique in Philosophy”, Philosophical Review (March, 1930), XXXIX: 127-152, offers a valuable corrective to the abuse of the sociological method.
14 Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 45; III, 378-90, agrees with Spengler that “societies, not states, are ‘the social atoms’ with which students have to deal” and that each civilization has its own penchant, bent, trend, or emphasis.
15 Cf. Ruth Benedict, op. cit., 54-5, 223-30; Thorstein Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class (New York, 1899), passim.
16 Ruth Benedict, op. cit., 223ff; John Dewey, op. cit., 106-171; Mark A. May and L. W. Doob, Competition and Cooperation (Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 25, New York, 1937); Margaret Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (New York, 1935) passim; Muzafer Sherif, op. cit., 113-204.
17 Justice Holmes also saw that “the law of fashion is a law of life. The crest of the wave of human interest is always moving, and it is enough to know that the depth was greatest in respect of a certain feature or style in literature or music or painting a hundred years ago to be sure at that point it no longer is so profound.” Collected Legal Papers. (New York, 1921), 210.
18 Erwin Schrödinger, Science and the Human Temperament (New York, 1935), 27-38, 81-132.
19 Cf. Franz Boas, Anthropology and Modern Life, 131-63, 198-236, and “History and Science in Anthropology,” American Anthropologist (Jan.-March, 1936), 38: 137-41; J. F. Brown, “Towards a Theory of Social Dynamics,” Journal of Social Psychology (May, 1935), 6: 182-213; Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 333-68; John Dewey, Logic (New York, 1938), 442-512; H. Levy, Science in an Irrational Society (London, 1934), 34-80; V. Pareto, Mind and Society, III, 1406-32, IV, passim; A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, II-V, IX-XI, (only the first 3 volumes of this 13 volume project have been published so far); and Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (New York, 1919), 56-81, 409-56.