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Perception, Representation, Realism, and Function

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Alison Ann Springle
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Abstract

According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate a different kind of representationalism.

Type
Cognitive Sciences
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 86 , Issue 5 , December 2019 , pp. 1202 - 1213
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

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To contact the author, please write to: University of Pittsburgh, Department of Philosophy; e-mail: alisonspringle@gmail.com.

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