Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T03:18:46.842Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Christopher Clarke
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I distinguish several doctrines that economic methodologists have found attractive, all of which have a positivist flavor. One of these is the doctrine that preference assignments in economics are just shorthand descriptions of agents’ choices. Although most of these doctrines are problematic, the latter doctrine about preference assignments is a respectable one, I argue. It does not entail any of the problematic doctrines, and indeed it is warranted independently of them.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 83 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 192 - 212
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I am indebted to Anna Alexandrova, Christopher Cowie, and Zina Ward for their invaluable comments on an ancestor of this manuscript, to Ken Binmore and Samir Okasha for many fruitful discussions on the topic, and to several anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This work has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant 284123.

References

Alexandrova, Anna, and Haybron, Daniel M.. 2011. “High Fidelity Economics.” In Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology, ed. Davis, John and Hands, Wade, 94–120. Cheltenham: Elgar.Google Scholar
Armstrong, David M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of Mind. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Rangel, Antonio. 2008. “Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics.” In The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, ed. Caplin, Andrew and Schotter, Andrew, 155–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Binmore, Ken. 2007a. Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, Ken 2007b. Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, Ken 2009. Rational Decisions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Bridgman, Percy Williams. 1927. The Logic of Modern Physics. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Bruni, Luigino, and Guala, Francesco. 2001. “Vilfredo Pareto and the Epistemological Foundations of Choice Theory.” History of Political Economy 33:21–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, Colin F., Loewenstein, George, and Prelec, Drazen. 2005. “Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 43:9–64. Revision of “Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106 (2004): 555–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clarke, Christopher. 2014. “Neuroeconomics and Confirmation Theory.” Philosophy of Science 81:195–215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, Joshua. 1995. “Samuelson’s Operationalist-Descriptivist Thesis.” Journal of Economic Methodology 2:53–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craver, Carl, and Alexandrova, Anna. 2008. “No Revolution Necessary: Neural Mechanisms for Economics.” Economics and Philosophy 24:381–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, Jerry. 1968. Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Frankish, Keith. 2004. Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, Milton. 1953. “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” In Essays in Positive Economics, 3–46. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Friedman, Milton, and Savage, Leonard J.. 1952. “The Expected-Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility.” Journal of Political Economy 60:463–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilboa, Itzhak. 2010. Rational Choice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gul, Faruk, and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang. 2008. “The Case for Mindless Economics.” In The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, ed. Caplin, Andrew and Schotter, Andrew, 3–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hands, D. Wade. 2004. “On Operationalisms and Economics.” Journal of Economic Issues 38:953–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harman, Gilbert. 1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hausman, Daniel M. 2000. “Revealed Preference, Belief and Game Theory.” Economics and Philosophy 16:99–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausman, Daniel M. 2008. “Mindful or Mindless Economics: A Methodological Evaluation.” In The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, ed. Caplin, Andrew and Schotter, Andrew, 125–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hausman, Daniel M. 2012. Preference, Value, Choice and Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hindriks, Frank. 2006. “Tractability Assumptions and the Musgrave-Mäki Typology.” Journal of Economic Methodology 13:401–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, and Tversky, Amos. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47:263–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, Wakker, Peter, and Sarin, Rakesh. 1997. “Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:375–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, Mark. 2002. “Decision Theory and Epistemology.” In The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, ed. Moser, Paul K., 434–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Maher, Patrick. 1993. Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mäki, Uskali. 2000. “Kinds of Assumptions and Their Truth: Shaking an Untwisted F-Twist.” Kyklos 53:317–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mäki, Uskali, ed. 2002. Fact and Fiction in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mas-Colell, Andreu, Winston, Michael D., and Green, Jerry R.. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Morgan, Mary. 2012. The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Musgrave, Alan. 1981. “Unreal Assumptions in Economic Theory: The F-Twist Untwisted.” Kyklos 34:377–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reiss, Julian. 2013. Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction. Abingdon: Routledge-Taylor.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosenberg, Alexander. 1992. Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Rosenberg, Alexander 2008. Philosophy of Social Science. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, Ariel, and Salant, Yuval. 2008. “Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference.” In The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, ed. Caplin, Andrew and Schotter, Andrew, 116–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. 1948. “Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference.” Economica 15:243–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, Amartya K. 1973. “Behaviour and the Concept of Preference.” Economica 40:241–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, Amartya K. 1993. “Internal Consistency of Choice.” Econometrica 61:495–521.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1994. “Gideon Rosen on Constructive Empiricism.” Philosophical Studies 74:179–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Varian, Hal R. 1992. Microeconomic Analysis. 3rd ed. London: Norton.Google Scholar
Varian, Hal R. 2005. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. 7th ed. London: Norton.Google Scholar
Wakker, Peter. 2010. Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wong, Stanley. 2006. The Foundations of Paul Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory. 2nd rev. ed. London: Routledge-Taylor.CrossRefGoogle Scholar