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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
The belief in the old type of a priori knowledge is gone. Cartesian innate ideas vanished with the severe criticism of Kant who held that only the form, not the content, of experience is known a priori. More recent criticism of Kant's a priori has taken place indirectly by way of the development of non-Euclidian geometries so that today there is no longer the belief that either the content or the form of experience is fixed and changeless or known with certainty a priori. But has the a priori phase of experience passed altogether? If not, what in recent thought has taken its place?
1 In a former article, “Two Kinds of Certainty”, (Philosophy of Science, January, 1940) the author points out that there is “logical certainty” and that it pertains to the syntactical dimension of semiosis. Secondly, there is “practical certainty,” which pertains to the semantical dimension of semiosis. In International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 2, C. W. Morris clarifies the various dimensions of semiosis and consequently, lays the basis for the present view concerning two kinds of certainty, and two kinds of a priori knowledge. Both his Monograph and the article, “Two Kinds of Certainty”, will serve as an excellent introduction to the present article.
2 Mr. Benjamin writes: “... it is not altogether untrue to say that constructionalism, conventionalism, and logical positivism are the rationalisms of modern scientific theory. ... All of these positions deny the necessity for any conception of the a priori; Yet it is significant that in these theories the knowing operations function essentially in the place of the a priori.” (An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, p. 170). Mr. Benjamin goes on to explain that the knowing operations, such as abstraction, definition, linguistic invention of formal systems, etc., are not a part of the data of science. Hence they constitute the intellectual means whereby we approach problems and are, in a sense, a priori—though not innate.
3 See Logic, The Science of Inquiry, p. 14.
4 Here we are conceiving of “habit” and “attitude” in relation to conduct. “Habit” designates an established act, or one which takes place without thinking. An attitude is the beginning of an act and is had when one is in readiness to act when the proper stimulus arises.
5 From an intellectual point of view, every proposition may be considered as probable. But from a practical point of view, i.e., in action, many propositions are accepted without question and are in fact certain. Certainty is a psychological experience, and it leads to overt conduct. To say a proposition is just highly probable is to admit that it is questionable. Yet one cannot actually question a given proposition without accepting others without reservation. Certainty and probability are correlative. In any particular situation some propositions are accepted without question. Those who consider all propositions as probable at all times, fail to consider the pragmatical or psychological dimension of semiosis, and they think of certainty as something objective to be attained, though not in fact attainable.
6 For example, we arbitrarily divide living organisms into “plants” and “animals”. Hence, we know prior to our experience with a living organism that it is either a plant or an animal. This, then, would be known a priori.