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Probability Logic and ℱ-Coherence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
In order that a degree-of-belief function be coherent it is necessary and sufficient that it satisfy the axioms of probability theory. This theorem relies heavily for its proof on the two-valued sentential calculus, which emerges as a limiting case of a continuous scale of truth-values. In this “continuum of certainty” a theorem analogous to that instanced above is proved.
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- Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association
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