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The Problem of Piecemeal Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Conor Mayo-Wilson
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Abstract

I argue that, in causal inference from many observational studies, the piecemeal collection of data can cause underdetermination, even if arbitrarily large amounts of reliable data are available. Two theorems reveal that, for any variable set V, there are causal theories over V that can be distinguished if and only if all variables are simultaneously measured. These results entail that, a priori, one cannot know which observational studies will be most informative with respect to the true causal theory describing V. Hence, scientific institutions may need to play a larger role in coordinating differing research programs.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 864 - 874
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to David Danks and Clark Glymour, who provided useful comments, corrections, and suggestions on several drafts of this article. The article also benefited greatly from discussions with participants at three conferences, namely, those sponsored by the Philosophy of Science Association, the British Society for Philosophy of Science, and the graduate students at Princeton and Rutgers.

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