Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
In Science, Truth, and Democracy, Philip Kitcher challenges the view that science has a single, context-independent, goal, and that the pursuit of this goal is essentially immune from moral critique. He substitutes a context-dependent account of science's goal, and shows that this account subjects science to moral evaluation. I argue that Kitcher's approach must be modified, as his account of science ultimately must be explicated in terms of moral concepts. I attempt, therefore, to give an account of science's goal that is free of direct moral entanglements but still makes this goal context-dependent and leaves the choice of which projects to pursue subject to moral scrutiny.
The author would like to thank Professors Paul Boghossian, Philip Kitcher, and William Ruddick, as well as two anonymous referees, for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.