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Putting on the Garber Style? Better Not

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Colin Howson
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Abstract

This article argues that not only are there serious internal difficulties with both Garber’s and later ‘Garber-style’ solutions of the old-evidence problem, including a recent proposal of Hartmann and Fitelson, but Garber-style approaches in general cannot solve the problem. It also follows the earlier lead of Rosenkrantz in pointing out that, despite the appearance to the contrary which inspired Garber’s nonclassical development of the Bayesian theory, there is a straightforward, classically Bayesian, solution.

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Type
Research Article
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Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 4 , October 2017 , pp. 659 - 676
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Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful advice.

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