Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
It is quite extraordinary, philosophically speaking, that according to the orthodox interpretation:
(a) quantum mechanics is a complete and comprehensive theory of microphysics, and yet
(b) the role of measurement, in quantum mechanics, cannot be analyzed in terms of the collective effects of the microphysical particles making up the apparatus.
It follows that, if the orthodox interpretation is correct, the measurement apparatus and its quantum physical effects cannot be accounted for microreductively. This is significant because it is widely believed that the relation between physical wholes and parts is microreductive. Indeed, many philosophers are persuaded of the inevitability of universal microreduction to the basic elements of microphysics. This is the viewpoint embodied in the program for the unity of science, espoused in recent years, most notably by Robert Causey (1977).
I would like to indicate my indebtedness to Peter Achinstein, David Zaret, Thomas Fulton, Gerard Emch, Nicolas Gisin, Henry Kyburg, Ralph Meerbote, Richard Feldman, Joseph Mendola, Joel Marks, Kenton Machina, Harry Deutsch, Robert Steinman, Shelley Stillwell, the anonymous Philosophy of Science referee and many others for their helpful comments.