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Rationality in Naturalized Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Edward P. Stabler Jr.
Edward P. Stabler Jr.*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario
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Abstract

Quine's (1969) proposal that the foundationalist programs in epistemology should be abandoned in favor of a scientific study of how we come to hold our theories about the world is still widely misunderstood. It does not eliminate the possibility of rational adjudication of scientific dispute, nor is it essentially tied to behaviorist approaches in psychology. On the contrary, recent work in psychology and philosophy of science can very naturally be seen as embodying the sort of program envisioned by Quine; now freed of behaviorist strictures, it clearly addresses issues that have been of interest in traditional epistemology. This view is defended with particular attention to Quine's concerns with translation and the related concerns with belief individuation which have inspired critics of recent cognitive psychology.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 64 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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Footnotes

†

I am indebted to William Demopoulos, Michael Friedman and Robert Matthews for helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.

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